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Authors: |
Rosenberg, Martin E. | |
Title: |
Chess RHIZOME Visualizing the Role of Metaphor in Interdisciplinary Science Studies | |
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Abstract: |
Chess RHIZOME explores hypertextually the range of references to chess, the chessboard, its pieces, its rules, and the peculiar role that time plays in the process of unfolding the game itself, across disciplinary boundaries. The method informing its design requires applying metaphor theory from the philosophy of science, with reference to the work of Gilles Deleuze on the role of forging contingent alliances across the disciplines of science, philosophy and the arts in epistemological investigations. The motive for this project is to explore the interdisciplinary dimensions of metaphor: particularly, it models the unstable nature of Boyd’s Theory Constitutive Metaphor (TCM) as a grounds for Deleuzian épistémocritique by mapping the tropical drift of chess to make visible its cultural work. This approach to the study of metaphor in science may add a level of rigor to concerns over the value of investigations into scientific knowledge and practices by those outside the sciences proper, by forcing scientists to recognize the need to take the role of metaphor much more seriously. Recent debates over the cultural studies of science have brought to the foreground the problem of metaphor in scientific discourse. This problem manifests itself in particular through a series of recent challenges to the ways in which cultural theorists attempt to construct correspondences between the laws governing physics and human cognition and laws governing the behavior of human beings and their institutions. Paul Gross and Norman Levitt, Alan Sokal and Alan Bricmont and others disparaging such interdisciplinary inquiry have scorned such constructions. In an e-mail message to me last February, the mathematician Norman Levitt states that he sees no middle ground between the construction of is and is not in representing, for example, the relationship between the behavior of atoms and the behavior of thoughts. He takes exception to such theorizing. He does so even though such a correspondence has been suggested by both Jacques Derrida, the philosopher and literary theorist, in an essay entitled "White Mythology," and by Henri Poincaré, the last great renaissance mathematician of the modern era, in an essay on scientific creativity entitled "Mathematical Discovery." We will return to this essay a bit later. In her recent (September, 1998) essay in Physics Today, Mara Beller demonstrates convincingly the pervasiveness of the construction of such correspondences between physical and cultural processes by such eminent physicists as Max Born, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli, John Wheeler and others. She observes: Like the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida, whom Steven Weinberg attacked in his 1996 New York Review of Books article on Sokal’s hoax, Bohr was notorious for the obscurity of his writing. Yet physicists relate to Derrida’s and Bohr’s obscurities in fundamentally different ways: to Derrida’s with contempt, to Bohr’s with awe. The circumstances generating this debate perhaps have more to do with academic politics between disciplines in a period of scarce resources for scholarly research, but there is something more important going on here. A fundamental question needs to be asked about the role of metaphor (and tropes generally speaking) in the formation of epistemology at the heart of scientific practices. Questions about the poetics of culture raised by Giambattista Vico and Friedrich Nietzsche as well as by Jacques Derrida and Hayden White, have become linked methodologically to the work on metaphor within the field of the philosophy of science. The issue of metaphor in science isn’t simply subsumed by the question of competing concepts of reality: as objectively there; as simply the construction of a model registering a scientist’s observations. Metaphor becomes the ground upon which these competing concepts of reality struggle. Since my current book project Fables of Self-Organization: The Cultural Work of Complexity in the Avant-Garde confronts this problem directly, I thought it might be useful to perform what in the field of science is called a "thought experiment" which would model how certain kinds of tropes become implicated in certain scientific epistemologies and not others. I wondered whether it might be possible to model how certain kinds of tropes drift across disciplinary boundaries and perform certain kinds of cultural work. I wondered whether it might be possible to make visible the ways in which metaphors might become symptoms for basic questions concerning the nature of reality through the lenses of a range of disciplines. Hypertext environments seem ideal for these kind of "thought experiments." Furthermore, there might be a certain kind of "irony" that becomes possible, when, as I have written about elsewhere, the very kinds of tropical speculations over the nature of hypertextual space and time have led, in turn, to similar kinds of debates over the role of metaphor. So, keeping in mind the metaphor of the mobius strip, what I would like to do is to foreground the additional problem of representing structures and processes of thought in hypertext using tropes derived from the sciences, by modeling hypertextually the problematic role of metaphor in interdisciplinary science studies. |
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| Martin E. Rosenberg, mrosenbe@kettering.edu Assistant Professor of Communication Kettering University |
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